This paper studies how the interaction between trade and educational institutions shapes the distribution of human capital and income within and across countries. In the model, heterogeneous agents self select into a continuum of occupational tasks depending on the wage structure and the cost of education. Exploiting the multiplicity of sectors and continuous support of possible human capital choices in our framework, we demonstrate that freer trade can induce crowding out of the middle occupations towards the skill acquisition extremes in one country and simultaneous expansion of middle-income industries in another. We find that individual gains from trade may be non-monotonic in ability type, and that middle ability agents can lose the most from trade liberalization despite aggregate gains. The model offers a novel lens through which to explore both educational policy and the implications of trade protection.
Politicians tend to portray education as the universal panacea for rising income inequality and perceived competition with foreign exporters, yet there is remarkably little evidence to speak to such claims. If indeed improvements to education would improve workers' global competitiveness, what are the potential distributional consequences of such policies? Given the structure of comparative advantage and differing tradeability of certain occupational outputs, would educational funding best be spent at the primary, secondary, or tertiary levels?
This paper marks an early attempt to address these questions by developing a model in which trade and educational institutions interact to determine individuals' skill acquisition decisions, the distribution of income, and ultimately the welfare consequences of freer trade. Our approach centers on a continuum-of-sectors framework with heterogenous agents and endogenous human capital acquisition. Comparative advantage is driven by international differences in educational institutions and the resulting differential costs of skill acquisition. By exploiting the multiplicity of sectors and continuous support of possible human capital choices, we can explore the interdependence between educational institutions and trade, and thus the implications of globalization for workers' welfare and government policy.
The modelling strategy we propose is in contrast to most existing work in the trade literature, which treats human capital as a binary variable.
1
In these earlier models, workers are either skilled or unskilled; under such a setup, the opening of trade will induce either skill upgrading (in a country with comparative advantage in skill intensive products) or skill downgrading (in countries with comparative advantage in 'basic' goods) through customary Stolper-Samuelson forces, but not both. A key
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3 prediction stemming from these models is immediate and unambiguous: in developed countries (which presumably hold comparative advantage in skill intensive goods), freer trade will induce workers to move to high skill, export-oriented sectors. The opposite holds true in countries with comparative advantage in less skill intensive goods (e.g. most developing countries), where freer trade would increase the relative demand for unskilled workers and and reduce workers' incentive to acquire human capital. The obvious policy implication then is that educational subsidies have the potential to smooth workers' transition to a liberalized trade environment in rich countries, but at the same time would make adjustment to trade even more difficult in the developing world.
Although analytically parsimonious, such a simple binary approach thus clearly oversimplifies the process of skill acquisition. Not only are the implications for education policy implausibly stark, the economic prediction denies an important empirical regularity: that within countries freer trade causes some workers to 'sort down' -often into low-skill service sector jobs -while others simultaneously 'sort up' into higher skill jobs. Surely there are workers in rich countries who choose to acquire less human capital following trade liberalization, just as there are individuals in developing countries who acquire greater skill sets when trade barriers are lowered. Goos and Manning (2007) find evidence of just this: as shown in Figure 1 , employment growth in the United Kingdom over the last few decades has been non-monotonic, with the low and top-end segments of the job quality spectrum experiencing considerable growth while employment in mid-range sectors has fallen. Similar evidence for the U.S. and Portugal has been demonstrated by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Falvay, Greenaway, and Silva (2008) , respectively. (Goos and Manning (2007)) We propose a new modelling framework that focuses on the interplay of trade, human capital acquisition, and employment, and in so doing capture the potential for observed non-monotonic shift in job growth. Our model features a continuum of heterogeneous agents who choose among a continuum of occupational sectors (or tasks), each of which requires a unique set of skills for employment. Each occupation is in turn used in the production of a particular intermediate product or service. Workers' wages are determined by sectoral technology and intermediate good/task pricesand thus indirectly by trade policy -while the cost of human capital acquisition is determined by individual characteristics and the country-specific structure of educational institutions. Faced with the resulting incentive structure, agents of different inherent ability levels self-select into sectors by investing in the corresponding human capital.
Trade liberalization leads to a remapping of agents to sectors, as do changes in trading partners' technologies, trade costs, or educational institutions that influence the cost of skill acquisition. The resulting shift in the demographics of skill composition can take many forms. One plausible and particularly salient scenario in line with the earlier diagram is the crowding out of the middle class towards the skill acquisition extremes, which could be brought about by increasing foreign competition in mid-technology intermediate goods/tasks (e.g., electronic components, basic machinery, or back office tasks like basic accounting or call center operation). That is, following increased competition from foreign producers in these mid-range sectors, some formerly moderate ability agents would invest more in human capital, while others optimally would invest less. While the aggregate gains from trade are positive, the distributional consequences are subtle and depend on both the relative structure of educational institutions across countries and the interaction between human capital and technology.
Our approach in this paper is motivated in part by recent work in labor economics that analyzes the diverging development of different segments of the labor market. As noted earlier, Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) , Goos and Manning (2007) , and Falvay, Greenaway, and Silva (2008) document that employment growth has been non-monotonic across sectors in that it is positive at the low and high ends of the labor market, but negative in the middle. While Autor and Dorn (2007) propose a simple three-sector model to explain this divergence, we provide a theoretical framework that is considerably more general and links the shift in employment and human capital to trade liberalization. The second motivation of our work, to which we alluded earlier, is the two-sector limitation of most of the trade literature that endogenizes human capital formation. This limitation (which we too are guilty of in Blanchard and Willmann (2008) ) leads to the artificial result that trade liberalization goes hand in hand with uniform skill upgrading in developed economies and skill downgrading in emerging markets.
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The questions addressed here are also closely related to important recent advances in trade theory. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) propose a two-sector model of trade in tasks and focus on the welfare effects of outsourcing specific tasks that can be carried out abroad. While our model is limited to a single final good, we endogenize workers' human capital decisions. In so doing, our paper offers a framework in which trade in tasks is driven by comparative advantage that arises endogenously due to international differences in educational systems. Also similar is the recent work by Jung and Mercenier (2008) , who propose a model that features outsourcing of intermediates at the same time as endogenizing the human capital decision. Their approach, however, is in many respects a two sector model; as a consequence, skill upgrading in their framework is necessarily uni-directional as in the more traditional trade literature. Finally, from a more technical standpoint, our continuum framework is reminiscent of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) , Costinot and Vogel (2009) , Anderson (2009), and Helpman, Isthoki, and Redding (2008) , though none of these papers endogenize workers' human capital decisions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model, analyze the effects of trade under the small country assumption, and give the equilibrium conditions for the large country case. Section 3 assumes functional forms to examine further the inner workings of the model and to present the equilibrium characteristics of a two country case with non-monotonic skill change. Section 4 explores the potential for complete specialization, the role of non-tradeables, and the model's implications for education policy. We conclude in Section 5.
The Model
The Home country is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous agents with unit mass. Individual agents differ in their inherent ability levels, a, assumed to be dis-tributed continuously over the unit interval with cumulative distribution function F (a) and corresponding density function f (a). Every agent is endowed with a single unit of labor, which is supplied inelastically to the labor market. . We assume that the cost of skill acquisition is increasing in the technological sophistication of the sector and decreasing in the ability level of the agent; further, the marginal cost of upgrading skills from one sector to the next is lower for high ability agents; finally, the cost of skill acquisition is convex across sectors for every agent. Formally:
Additionally, for tractability, let:
where h(·) and g(·) are twice continuously differentiable and non-negative over the unit interval.
Optimal Sorting and Production. Agents consume only the final good Y with non-satiated preferences. Thus, when deciding which sector to enter, every agent a chooses j to maximize his net real wage, w(j) − c(j, a). The first order condition for each individual's optimal human-capital level is then:
Using superscript dots to denote derivatives with respect to j, the first order condition for agent a's optimal human capital decision/sectoral choice then may be rewritten:
The second order condition is satisfied as long as the wage schedule (which is exogenous in a small open economy and endogenous if the country is large or autarkic)
is not more convex than the cost function; i.e.ẅ(j) ≤c (j, a) . Tautologically, the second order condition must obtain for all j in any diversified equilibrium.
The first order condition in (2.5) determines the allocation of ability types to sectors. Solving yields the optimal allocation (or self-sorting) of ability levels to sectors: -the first order condition satisfies single crossing so that agents map to sectors assortatively. Moreover, we obtain strictly monotonic sorting of agents to occupations as long as the second order condition holds with strict inequality. Formally:
(Proof in appendix.) When a(j) is strictly monotonic, and thus invertible, we denote the function that maps ability types to sectors by j(a).
Combining this allocation of workers to sectors with the underlying distribution of ability types, f (a), we then obtain the domestic supply schedule for intermediates, which given our one-to-one assumption for technology is simply the density of agents in each sector:
Notice that the wage schedule and the cost of skill acquisition enter the intermediate Equilibrium Conditions. Full employment requires that the density of agents in 4 Ifẇ(j) ≤ 0, then no worker would be willing to bear the cost of education required to work in sector j sinceċ(j, a) > 0∀a, j.
5 Recall that constant returns to scale technology implies that conditional factor demand may be
each sector maps to the unit mass of population; i.e.:
Market clearing in each factor market implies, moreover, that:
The zero profit condition in aggregate good production implies that total revenue must equal total factor payments so that:
Finally consumers' balanced budget condition requires that: 
Partial Equilibrium: A Small Open Economy
Before moving to the full general equilibrium specification in the next section, we consider the case of a small open economy; this allows us to demonstrate the intuition underlying our main results in the simplest possible framework. In this section, we assume that all intermediates are traded under non-prohibitive trade costs so that the wage schedule for intermediate goods/tasks may be taken as fixed. We define τ j to be one plus the ad-valorem trade cost (including any import tariff/export tax) specific to sector j. Hence, for imported intermediates, w(j) = τ j w w (j), while for 6 Tariff revenue, if appropriate, would simply be added to the right hand side of (2.11).
, where w w (j) denotes the world price of output j. Assume additionally thatẇ(j) is continuous in j over the unit interval. (Continuity of the derivative wage schedule,ẇ(j), will obtain in general equilibrium as will be clear from the next section, but for now must be assumed explicitly).
Equilibrium is best described through a pair of simple graphs. before, so thatẇ(j) shifts down, agents will 'sort down' to lower j occupations in 7 In our static model, agents' decisions necessarily reflect current prices, though in reality, one would expect sectoral adjustments to take time. To address this issue (and the related political economy questions), we plan to develop a dynamic analog to this model in a companion paper. remains unchanged will keep her current occupation, while agents to the left ofā will sort into lower j sectors while agents to the right sort into higher j occupations.
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The consequence is vacating of the middle j sectors, those that require a modest skill set and offer mid-range wages. As agents move to the skill acquisition extremes, the 'middle class' occupations reduce employment and production.
10
9 Naturally, one can envision a new derivative wage schedule that crosses the old derivative wage schedule in several places. Such a scenario is entirely plausible (for instance, there is no reason to expect changes in the transportation/offshoring costs to be consistent across sectors) and simply would result in a more complex pattern of non-monotonic skill change. 10 Some sectors may be abandoned completely following an increase in the tradeability or declining world prices of certain goods. The complete vacating of a range of sectors would manifest as a 'flat spot' in the mapping function a(j) that arises whenẇ(j) coincides withċ(ã, j) for some interval [j,j] and some agent (or agents)ã. For the set of sectors over which the cost-derivative and wagederivative functions overlap, agentã would be indifferent over sectoral choice within those bounds while all agents a <ã strictly would prefer sectors j < j while agents with ability a >ã strictly would prefer sectors indexed abovej. Since any given agent has zero mass, all sectors between the While the implications of changing world prices and trade costs for human capital acquisition are clear from the optimal sorting mechanism in (2.6), the individual welfare effects are necessarily more nuanced because real wages and the cost of education both move with the change in wages and the concomitant shift in human capital decisions. The net welfare effect for each individual worker will depend on the balance of these forces; it should not be surprising, then, that generalizable welfare conclusions cannot be drawn in the absence of functional form assumptions. The two country example presented in Section 3 highlights this tradeoff between shifting real wages and educational costs, calculating explicitly the individual welfare effects of trade. First, however, we lay out the basic structure of the general equilibrium framework.
General Equilibrium: A Two Country Model
To endogenize the wage schedule, we now introduce a second country, Foreign, which for the most part mirrors Home. Like Home, Foreign is assumed to have a unit mass of population with the same underlying ability distribution, F (a). Home and Foreign constituents have the same non-satiated preferences over consumption of the final good and supply their labor inelastically. Further, we assume that Home and Foreign share the same technology in producing intermediates from (trained) labor and in making the final good; this simplification allows us to focus on the role of educational institutions in driving comparative advantage.
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Foreign country variables are identified by an asterisk, and obey the restrictions and equilibrium conditions set forward for Home.
bounds j andj then would be effectively empty of workers. Figure 4 . We first define the generalized equilibrium conditions under autarky and free trade, then move to a functional form example to derive illustrative closed form results. Under autarky, Home's equilibrium wage schedule is given implicitly by:
(2.12) and (2.13 )
(2.14)
And likewise in Foreign. Thus, for a given input/factor demand structure, the more convex the cost function in j, the steeper the equilibrium wage schedule. This makes sense; to the extent that skill upgrading becomes increasingly expensive for more 12 Starting from the numeraire, w(0) ≡ 1, the functionẇ(j) determines the full wage schedule,
sophisticated (high j) sectors, the higher the incremental wage increases must be to induce workers to enter the most demanding occupations.
Under trade we have the analogous condition, where for any sector j in which both Home and Foreign produce: In sectors in which only one country produces, the market clearing condition is adjusted accordingly and only the producing country's cost schedule influences the wage.
The equilibrium free trade wage schedule then determines the supply of intermediates, aggregate output, consumption, and the pattern of trade just as in the previous section.
In general, the market clearing conditions in (2.13) and (2.16) are characterized by a third order differential equation of the wage schedule over j. should not be surprising that closed form solutions prove the exception rather than the rule.
The following section describes a case in which functional form assumptions do 13 a (j) is a function ofẇ(j) andẅ(j) while x(j) depends in general on the complete w(j) schedule.
Moreover, in a model with multiple final goods in which aggregate final goods output depends on its own price (i.e. Y (p)), the market clearing condition would instead be given by fourth order differential equation.
offer analytical solutions in the general equilibrium model. In generating a set of closed form results, we highlight the role of educational institutions in determining both comparative advantage and the implications of trade for human capital acquisition, welfare, and income distribution within and across countries.
A General Equilibrium Example
In this section we provide a concrete example of our model that illustrates the simultaneous 'sorting up' and 'sorting down' of moderate ability agents and the negative welfare effects trade can have on the middle class. In order to make things tractable, we assume the following cost structures of education in home and foreign respectively:
On the factor demand side we assume Leontief production of the final good, thereby abstracting from possible substitution effects across intermediates.
14 With ψ( y) ≡ min{y 0 , ..., y 1 }, unit factor demand is simply one in each sector and country, regardless of the wage schedule; thus, x(j) ≡ x j ( w, 1) = x * (j) = 1. Following the solution procedure outlined in the previous section, we solve for the equilibrium wage sched-
14 More generally, substitution effects would dampen the magnitude of wage schedule changes, but
would not overturn our qualitative findings; the technical benefit of the Leontief assumption is that
x j ( w, 1) = 1∀j so that the intermediate market clearing condition is of only the second order (rather than third) and thus solvable.
Where we have used the boundary condition that the wage schedule must be flat at the upper end,ẇ(1) = 0, to pin down the respective constants of integration.
15 Figure 5 shows that the slope of the equilibrium wage schedule under free trade is a weighted average of the autarky values. Note in particular that the intersection of the autarky wage slopes leads to the same value of the slope of the equilibrium wage schedule under free trade. As discussed before, the equilibrium wage schedule implies a corresponding mapping of agents to sectors by ability level. In autarky, of course, the Leontief technology assumption implies a uniform density of workers across sectors; thus:
Under free trade the sectoral mappings take the following form: 8) and are depicted in Figure 6 .
15 This boundary condition ensures that there is not a mass of workers clustered in sector j = 1. We are especially interested in the welfare effects arising from trade liberalization. To get at real welfare effects, we first determine the real wage schedules under In what follows we first focus on the welfare effects in Home. As we will see below, the effects in Foreign are virtually a mirror image. The real welfare change consists of the effect on the real wage and the change in the realized cost of education.
We analyze first the effect on the real wage. The two panels in Figure 8 depict respectively the change in the real wage in sector j and the change in the real wage of agent a given her optimal sectoral choice under each trading regime.
From the first panel in Figure 8 , we see that real wages rise for the low and shifted the identity of the 'biggest loser' to the right. Indeed, consider the plight of the agent a = .6. Although her real wage has increased, the increased cost of education required to achieve the higher paying job more than offsets the wage gain so that the net welfare change is negative. Conversely, agent a = .2 suffers a substantial real wage loss yet enjoys a modest net welfare improvement due to his now lower cost of education. A crucial caveat to this second statement is that lower costs of education cannot be recovered if they are sunk. In a dynamic framework with Turning now to the Foreign country, we see that the net welfare effects are a 24
mirror image of what happens at home. The three panels in Figure 11 depict the change in the real wage per agent a, the change in the real cost of education, and the net welfare effect in the foreign country. In contrast to Home, we find that the real wage increases most for Foreign agents in the middle of the income distribution while falling at the distribution extremes. At the same time, the cost of education rises for the lower forty percent of the distribution of workers and fall for the remainder.
The net welfare effect of trade is shown in the final panel of Figure 11 , where we see that middle ability agents gain from trade, while the highest and lowest ends of the population distribution lose. 
Extensions

Limited Diversification
In the example introduced in the previous section, every task is carried out in both countries in equilibrium; that is, even under free trade, the production of intermediates remains fully diversified across the entire range of occupations. This needn't hold in general. We now present a modified case where trade induces one trading partner to stop production of a particular subset of intermediates, a phenomenon that is certainly relevant in reality, where for example certain inputs can be sourced locally only at very high cost. Suppose the educational costs take the following (slightly
and assume the same production technology for the final good as before. We can solve for the autarky and free trade equilibrium wage schedules:
These are graphically depicted in Figure 13 . Note that the free trade equilibrium slope of the wage schedule (sandwiched between the autarky schedules) consists of two parts: up to j = 1 4
(1 + √ 5) ≡j both countries produce each task, whereas above only the home country does. This is because at the upper bound (j = 1) the marginal costs of education for the most able agents in both countries differ: the domestic agent with a = 1 only has half as high a marginal cost as the foreign agent, a * = 1. Hence in equilibrium, the most able foreign agent does not find it worthwhile to acquire the sophisticated skills necessary to carry out the most sophisticated task. Instead she choosesj < 1.
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17 We find this threshold by using the boundary conditionċ(a = 1, j = 1) =ẇ to determine the constant of integration of the w-dot schedule that equates home supply to world demand. Since 'smooth pasting' of the wage schedules for the upper and lower ranges implies the same derivative at the threshold, we find the threshold by plugging a * = 1 into the 'only home production' schedule already determined. 'Smooth pasting' then pins down the constant of integration of the schedule to the left where both countries produce. As before, graphing the ability-to-task mappings under autarky and free trade in Figure 14 indicates how trade liberalization affects the skill acquisition decisions:
to the left of the intersection agents at home sort down, whereas higher ability agents sort up and acquire more sophisticated skills, and the opposite happens in the foreign country. Thus the result that domestic agents vacate the middle obtains here as well. Finally, comparing the wage change and the change in the cost of education gives the welfare effects depicted in Figure 15 . Again we see that the middle ability agents at home lose out whereas agents at the bottom and top benefit from trade, and the welfare effects in the foreign country are the opposite. We have therefore confirmed that our previous result is robust to the possibility that countries restrict the range of tasks they produce in response to trade liberalization.
Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model of trade and education that allows for differentiated effects of trade liberalization on skill acquisition. Agents of different ability levels selfselect into sectors by acquiring the specific education necessary to work in a particular sector, or perform a particular task. This mapping of ability level to sectors depends on the wage or price schedule and hence on a country's openness to trade. We show how changes in the price schedule affect this mapping and lead agents to sort up and down simultaneously. If a country's educational cost structure is less convex than that of its trading partners, then low ability agents sort down and higher ability agents sort up, and we obtain a 'vacating of the middle' with corresponding negative welfare effects for the middle class. This result provides one possible explanation for the current public concern over the negative effects of globalization on the middle class.
Our framework can shed light on the potential differential impacts of strengthening educational institutions. Government subsidies to education or similar institutional improvements that decrease the cost of skill acquisition over some ranges of sectors or for certain agents would impact the distribution of human capital decisions and thus the pattern of trade and comparative advantage, aggregate social welfare, and intra-national income distribution. In more general terms, the model developed here provides a novel reason for trade. By abstracting from differences in technology or preferences, we show how differences in educational institutions endogenously give rise to comparative advantage and hence trade.
In future work, we intend to use the framework developed here to analyze the effects of a differentiated educational policy that focuses on primary, secondary, or tertiary education. Uniform subsidies to education across the board are hardly the optimal policy recommendation resulting from our model. Perhaps highly targeted educational policies such as Brazil's are not as irrational and driven by specific interests as might seem at first sight. In addition, our model is well suited to study the effects of educational migration, i.e. the phenomenon recently documented in Blanchard, Bound, and Turner (2008) that students acquire education in another country and then either stay or return, which is of particular relevance for developing countries. In a somewhat more technical extension, we plan to explore systematically the nature of the interaction of technological changes with trade and education, in an effort to inform an empirical strategy for identifying the welfare effects of trade apart from technological innovation (while still recognizing the endogeneity of worker's hu-man capital decisions). Finally, we intend a simplified version of this model as the building block for a dynamic endogenous trade policy model along the lines of our previous work in Blanchard and Willmann (2008) .
